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F RANCHISING as a means of doing business has had a phenomenal
growth. It has been hailed as a tremendous benefit for the small busi-
nessman and a boon to the economy of the nation. It has been estimated
that seventy to ninety-one billion dollars worth of goods and services are
sold annually through franchise arrangements. Franchising accounts for ten
per cent of the gross national product and twenty-five per cent of all retail
sales. 400,000 business men are franchisees.'
Arrangements which fit into the broad category of franchising can be
classified into three types: (1) those primarily concerned with distributing
the franchisor's product; (2) those that establish manufacturing or pro-
cessing plants; and (3) those that establish retail outlets where the fran-
chisor is selling a name or format of doing business such as is generally
found in restaurant and motel operations, service organizations, employ-
ment, and retail sales to the public.
In each instance, however, the success of the franchise will depend upon
the mark or name chosen for the enterprise. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said in Mishawaka Mfg. Co. v. Kresge Co.:'
A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to se-
lect what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants . . . . What-
ever the means employed, the aim is the same-to convey through the
mark, in the minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity
upon which it appears. Once this is attained, the trademark owner has some-
thing of value.'
This Article will outline the means available to a prospective franchisor
for protection of this valuable asset, the reasons for securing such protec-
tion, and will discuss some of the usual trademark problems encountered
by the franchisor in connection with territorial expansion and maintaining
the proper control over the quality of the goods and services.
I. SECURING REGISTRATION OF THE TRADEMARK
Some franchises operate under names which have acquired familiarity
across the country as the result of an individual's reputation in the sports
and entertainment fields. Many franchises, however, do not start with this
advantage and may not be known outside the area in which they have their
beginning. In either circumstance, it is important for the franchisor to
secure the protection and advantages afforded a trademark or service mark
B.A., Johns Hopkins University; LL.B., University of Maryland. Attorney at Law, New York,
New York.
' Report of Ad Hoc Comm. on Franchising, 444 CCH TRADE REG. REPORTS 6 (Dec. 15, 1969).
2316 U.S. 203 (1942).
3id. at 205.
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owner under the provisions of the Federal Trademark Act.' It should be
understood, however, that trademark rights in this country are acquired
by use of the mark and not by registration. Registration of the mark,'
either under the federal trademark statute or under any of the state trade-
mark statutes, does not create rights nor increase the scope of such sub-
stantive rights. The trademark owner who does not wish to register his
mark may still rely upon the common law for protection of his rights.
However, most trademark owners who are engaged in interstate commerce
have found it desirable to obtain the advantages of the federal trademark
statute.
One of the principal benefits of a federal registration is its deterrent
effect upon subsequent users, for anyone interested in adopting a new mark
for use throughout the country is well advised to search the existing federal
registrations and pending applications. A registration of either the identical
or similar mark should warn the subsequent user to adopt a different mark
from those registered to avoid litigation.
There are specific provisions of the Trademark Act itself which are
helpful to a franchise operation, particularly when an expansion program is
started. For example, section 22e provides that a registration on the
Principal Register is constructive notice of the registrant's claim of owner-
ship." Thus, anyone who adopts a mark confusingly similar to one regis-
tered after the isssuance date of the registration is held to have adopted with
knowledge of the prior registrant's claim of ownership." In addition, under
section 33 (a)9 the registration is prima facie evidence of the exclusive right
to use the mark, and section 33(b) " provides that after five years of
consecutive use, the mark becomes incontestable and is conclusive evidence
of the registrant's right to use, subject to certain defenses. The importance
of these sections will be discussed further in connection with expansion
problems.
Assuming that the mark selected by the franchisor is not in conflict with
a prior registration, the primary requirement to be met in order to file the
application to register a mark is that it be "used in commerce."11 For the
purposes of the Trademark Act, a mark is deemed used in commerce when
it is affixed to goods, containers, or displays associated therewith, and the
goods are sold or transported in interstate commerce."2 For the purpose of
services, "used in commerce" means the sale or advertising of such services
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1964), also known as the Lanham Act.
' Section 45 of the Trademark Act defines "mark" as including "any trademark, [or] service
mark." 15 U.S.C. 5 1127 (1964). A trade name may be registered under the federal act only if
it is used in a trademark sense.
615 U.S.C. § 1072 (1964).
'The Act also provides for registration on the Supplemental Register for marks which, because
of descriptiveness, cannot qualify for registration on the Principal Register. 15 U.S.C. 5 1091
(1964). Marks so registered are not entitled to many of the important benefits of a principal regis-
tration, such as constructive notice. 15 U.S.C. § 1094 (1964).






which are rendered in interstate commerce. 3 However, it has also been held
that services which merely affect interstate commerce may meet the neces-
sary requirement. For example, in In re Gastown, Inc." the Court of Cus-
toms and Patent Appeals held that automotive or truck maintenance per-
formed by a chain of service stations, some of which were located on an
interstate highway, affected interstate commerce and thus qualified for
registration. For franchisors engaged in restaurant and related services, it
is not now necessary to show that such services affect interstate commerce.
In In re Smith Oil Corp." an application was filed for registration of a
service mark used in connection with a restaurant. The Examiner refused
registration on the grounds that there was no interstate commerce, but the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board held that the Civil Rights Act of
19640 made it clear that restaurants serving food to interstate travelers
were engaged in commerce which may be lawfully regulated by Congress.
On this basis, registration was permitted.
Once a federal registration is obtained, it may also be desirable, as
additional protection, to consider registration in the states in which the
mark is used. Ordinarily, if a federal registration can be obtained, state
registrations are not necessary. However, many small businessmen do not
check the federal register if they have an intrastate business and will gen-
erally apply only for registration at the state level. The Secretary of State's
office should reject any application for registration of a mark which is
similar to a prior registration; thus, a state registration also acts as a
deterrent to the second comer. However, to secure a state registration with-
out sufficient use in that state may not be sufficient. A recent decision in
Florida, Abner's Beef House Corp. v. Abner's International, Inc.,'7 is of
interest on this subject. There, the plaintiff secured a state registration in
Florida for the mark "Abner's" for restaurant services in 1967 based on
"use" established by mailing sandwiches to its organizers. Defendant, in
1968, opened a restaurant in Miami under the name "Abner's" and at the
time of the trial had executed twenty franchise agreements. Up to the time
of trial, the plaintiff still had not operated any restaurants in Florida under
the name "Abner's." The Florida supreme court found that under these
circumstances neither party had acquired, as against the other, the exclu-
sive right to the name "Abner's" through usage sufficient to obtain owner-
ship of a secondary meaning in the name. In arriving at this decision, the
court said:
,A mere paper application for registration of a service mark which is not in
fact coupled with and supported by actual usage of the mark sufficient to
vest in registrant's use a secondary meaning, will not defeat a similar use by
a competitor where the latter has actually established and placed in operation
businesses identified by such mark."
13 Id.
' 140 U.S.P.Q. 216 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
15 156 U.S.P.Q. 63 (T.T.A.B. 1967).
'"42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-2000 (1967).
'1227 So. 2d 865, 164 U.S.P.Q. 157 (Fla. 1969).
1d. at 869, 164 U.S.P.Q. at 160.
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As a result of this decision, both parties are entitled to use the mark in
Florida.
The value of a federal registration becomes more important when the
franchisor expands into areas in which he has not previously done business
and does not have an arbitrary mark or one which has acquired a secondary
significance." Under such circumstances, if there is a conflict between a
federal and state registration of the same mark and there is concurrent use
within a state, the federal registration takes precedence over a state regis-
tration with respect to expansion of the mark within the state. This is true
even when the state registration is secured prior to the federal registration.
This was the rationale in the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots." There, the
plaintiff had opened several Burger King restaurants in Florida in 1953 and
expanded through Florida, Georgia, and Tennessee. The defendants in 1957
had opened a "Burger King" restaurant in Matoon, Illinois, and secured a
state registration in that state in 1959 without notice of plaintiff's prior
use. In 1961, plaintiff opened its first restaurant in Skokie, Illinois. By that
time, plaintiff had notice of defendant's prior registration in Illinois. On
October 3, 1961, when a certificate of registration was issued by the United
States Patent Office to plaintiff, there were more than fifty Burger King
restaurants in Illinois. In 1962, defendants opened a second restaurant in
Charleston, Illinois. The district court held that on the basis of plaintiff's
federal registration, it was entitled to use the mark in Illinois except in the
limited area where defendants actively used the same trademark prior to
plaintiff's federal registration, notwithstanding plaintiff's notice of de-
fendants' prior state registration.
In affirming, the court of appeals said that under the Act, plaintiff had
the incontestable right to use the mark in commerce and that under the
statute the certificate of registration was conclusive evidence of plaintiff's
"exclusive right" to use the mark. The court went on to say:
Congress expanded the common law, however, by granting an exclusive right
in commerce to federal registrants in areas where there has been no offsetting
use of the mark. Congress intended the Lanham Act to afford nation-wide
protection to federally-registered marks, and that once the certificate has
issued, no person can acquire any additional rights superior to those obtained
by the federal registrant."'
On the other hand, the franchisor may find that the infringing use com-
menced after it secured its federal registration" but before its mark had
'9 "Arbitrary" trademarks, also referred to as "fanciful" or "technical" trademarks, may be
common words taken from everyday speech and used in an arbitrary sense as trademarks, or words
newly invented. The doctrine of secondary meaning contemplates that a word originally geographi-
ically or otherwise descriptive with reference to an article on the market has been used so long and
so exclusively by one producer that it has come to be to the trade and the public his trademark.20403 F.2d 904, 159 U.S.P.Q. 706 (7th Cir. 1968).
1 Id. at 908, 159 U.S.P.Q. at 709.
" It must be remembered that under § 1115 (b) (5) of the Trademark Act, a federal registration
is constructive notice to a second user, but it is not constructive notice to anyone who adopted the
mark prior to the date of registration, without knowledge. 15 U.S.C. S 1115 (b) (5) (1964). Thus,
in Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. The Hot Shoppe, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 777, 133 U.S.P.Q. 252 (M.D.N.C.
1962), the court held that the plaintiff, who had a federal registration, was not entitled to enjoin
[Vol. 24
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acquired a secondary meaning in the new territory. Because of the con-
structive notice provision of the Lanham Act, 3 the subsequent user has no
defense based on a claim of lack of knowledge. However, while the courts
have made statements to the effect that it is the intent of the Lanham Act
to provide nation-wide protection for expanding business and nation-wide
protection for registered marks regardless of geographical areas, the deci-
sions have not gone so far as to give the registrant an injunction in such
instances based solely upon the fact that the mark has been registered. In-
stead, where no secondary meaning has been established, the courts have
taken the position that under the test of confusing similarity established by
the Lanham Act, the second use may be enjoined only when it is likely to
cause confusion. Therefore, as long as the registrant and the subsequent
user operate in different areas, there can be no likelihood of confusion. But,
because of the constructive notice provision of the Lanham Act, the sub-
sequent use will be enjoined when the first user expands into that area.
This is the rationale of such cases as Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores,
Inc., 4 American Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc.," John R. Thompson Co.
v. Holloway,"s and 7-11 Minute Markets, Inc. v. The Southland Corp."
While such decisions may not be entirely satisfactory to the registrant of
the mark, as the registrant does not get relief until it begins to do business
in the contested area, such a decision does have a deterrent effect on the
second user, since it must make a decision whether to change its mark
immediately or to wait until the plaintiff shows an intent to use the mark
in its area. It is not likely that, under these circumstances, the second user
will decide to invest substantially in a mark it may be forced to discontinue
whenever the plaintiff appears on the scene.
Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc." is a recent decision
where these principles are discussed. There, the plaintiff began to use the
mark "Mister Donut" in 1955 for the promotion and franchising of retail
doughnut shops in Massachusetts. In 1956, plaintiff secured an assignment
of "Mr. Donut" from a previous registrant and recorded the assignment in
the Patent Office. In 1957, defendant opened a California store under the
same name. In 1958, plaintiff secured a registration of the mark "Mr.
Donut" in the Patent Office. In 1966, plaintiff opened a shop in California,
but plaintiff's proposed licensees refused to purchase franchises because of
the existence of defendant's shops in Orange and Los Angeles Counties.
The district court held that the assignment in 1956 was in gross in that
there was no pretense that the assignor's estate had transferred any cus-
tomer lists, merchandise, equipment, recipes, decals, or other goods. There-
fore, there was no constructive notice to the defendant from the assign-
a local user who commenced use without knowledge of plaintiff's use prior to the date of registra-
tion. However, the use is limited to the area in which such continuous use is proved.
2315 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (5) (1964).
24267 F.2d 358, 121 U.S.P.Q. 430 (2d Cir. 1959).
-312 F.2d 619, 136 U.S.P.Q. 286 (5th Cir. 1963).
26366 F.2d 108, 150 U.S.P.Q. 728 (5th Cir. 1966).
u2 301 F. Supp. 1000, 161 U.S.P.Q. 562 (D. Nev. 1969).
21 164 U.S.P.Q. 67 (9th Cir. 1969).
1970]
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ment in 1956, although there was constructive notice from the 1958 regis-
tration. However, the lower court held that the defendant's use did not
affect interstate commerce and, therefore, defendant's intrastate use was
not an infringement. The lower court relied upon the decision in Fairway
Foods, Inc. v. Fairway Markets, Inc." The court of appeals distinguished
between the facts of the Fairway case and the Mr. Donut case, holding:
Fairway Foods thus stands for the rule that where the federal registrant
and the intrastate user of conflictingly similar trade marks are using the re-
spective marks in geographically separate and distinct market areas, with
no real competition between them, and where there is no present likelihood
that the federal registrant will expand his use into the area of use of the
intrastate user, there is no cause shown for injunctive relief based on infringe-
ment .... Plaintiff has firmly established its nationwide doughnut shop busi-
ness in California and is now competing with the defendant for shop loca-
tions in the same market area, i.e., Orange County. Each party has plans to
expand throughout southern California and thus increase the competitive
situation....
We hold that where a federal registrant has expanded its business to the
point that the use of the conflictingly similar marks by the registrant and
the unauthorized user are no longer confined to separate and distinct market
areas and there is established the likelihood of public confusion, the federal
registrant is entitled under the authority of the Lanham Act to injunctive
relief."
Without the constructive notice provision of the Federal Trademark Act,
the owners of the non-distinctive marks would not have secured even the
delayed relief granted in the Dawn Donut, Golden Flake, and Holloway
decisions. However, where secondary meaning can be shown, the courts
will grant an injunction without such delay. In Holiday Inns of America,
Inc. v. Mullen's Holiday Inn, Inc." the defendant had begun operations in
1947 as Holiday Auto Court and in 1963 put up signs reading "Mullen's
Holiday Inn." The court held that plaintiff had acquired a secondary mean-
ing across the country and that defendant's use resulted in confusion of
the public, posed a threat to the established good will and reputation of
plaintiff's motels, and, therefore, enjoined defendant's use of "Holiday
Inn."
When defendant's use is an intentional appropriation, there is no require-
ment for the establishment of secondary meaning. Under such circum-
stances, in TraveLodge Corp. v. Siragusa," the court granted an injunction
against the use of an infringing mark by defendant on a motel in Alabama,
a state into which plaintiff had not yet expanded. However, the court also
concluded that even if defendant's use had been innocent, the plaintiff had
established secondary significance in Alabama by the following means:
1. Advertising its motels by listings in auto club tour books, and
directories.
29227 F.2d 193, 107 U.S.P.Q. 253 (9th Cir. 1969).
30 164 U.S.P.Q. at 70-71.
31292 F. Supp. 755, 158 U.S.P.Q. 536 (E.D. Cal. 1968).
a2 2 2 8 F. Supp. 238, 141 U.S.P.Q. 719 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
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2. Distributing postcards, stationery, matches, and other advertising
material.
3. Proof of expenditures for advertising in excess of $3,500,000
which included:
(a) 3,450,000 TraveLodge directories distributed throughout
the country, including Alabama;
(b) 1,900 highway billboard signs;
(c) national advertisements in Newsweek, Business Week, Time,
U.S. News 0 World Report, and Holiday."
II. CONTROLLING THE TRADEMARK
Once the franchisor commences to expand the franchise, care must be
taken that the franchisee maintains the quality-control standards associated
with the product or service. This can be a very difficult problem. Insuffi-
cient control may result in loss of the mark, and excessive control may give
rise to a claim of antitrust violation.
The concept of an owner allowing others to use its mark is a relatively
recent development in the common law of trademarks and was first recog-
nized by the courts in Keebler Weyl Baking Co. v. ]. S. Ivins' Son. " The
court there held that the license agreements under consideration did not
destroy the trademark rights and said:
The use of a trade-mark does not any longer necessarily import that the
articles on which it is used are manufactured by the user but it may be enough
that they are manufactured for him, that he controls their production or even
that they pass through his hands in the course of trade and that he gives to
them the benefit of his reputation and name or business style."
The Lanham Act recognized the development of licensing of trademarks
by providing in section 5 that use of a trademark by a "related company"
inures to the benefit of the registrant or applicant, provided such mark is
not used in such a manner as to deceive the public." In section 45 of the
Act a "related company" is defined as "any person who legitimately con-
trols or is controlled by the registrant or applicant for registration in re-
spect to the nature and quality of the goods or services in connection with
which the mark is used."'"
The franchisor or licensor not only must exercise control to protect its
interests, but more than that, the courts have placed the burden on an
owner and licensor to maintain the nature and quality of the goods and
services produced by the licensee. Thus, in discussing the related company
concept under the provisions of the Lanham Act, the court in Huntington
National Mattress Co. v. Celanese Corp.8 said:
Even if the affiliated companies are so controlled by Huntington as to be
33 Id. at 244, 141 U.S.P.Q. at 724.
347 F. Supp. 211, 23 U.S.P.Q. 21 (E.D. Pa. 1934).
351d. at 214, 23 U.S.P.Q. at 23-24.
15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1964).
'"Id. § 1127.3"201 F. Supp. 938, 132 U.S.P.Q. 395 (D. Md. 1962).
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'related companies' within the meaning of the statute, there is a duty on
Huntington, as the owner and licensor of the registered mark Cloud, to take
reasonable means to detect and prevent misleading uses of its mark by the
affiliated companies. The only effective way to protect the public, where a
trademark is used by licensees, is to place on the owner the affirmative duty
of policing in a reasonable manner the activities of his licensees to assure
that the licensee will apply the mark to a product of substantially the same
quality that the public has in the past associated with it. 9
Similarly, in Franchised Stores of New York, Inc. v. Winter4 the plain-
tiffs alleged infringement of the Carvel name and trademarks, unfair
competition, and violation of the franchise agreement when the defendant
sold non-Carvel ice cream and frozen dairy products as Carvel ice cream
and frozen dairy products in packages bearing the Carvel name and trade-
marks. The defendant alleged that a franchised dealer cannot be guilty of a
trademark infringement. The court enjoined the defendant, saying that a
franchised dealer had a greater duty not to infringe a trademark license
than a non-dealer. Again, in Carve[ Farms Corp. v. Nathan"' the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of New York found trademark
infringement existed when the franchised dealer used the licensed trade-
marks on products which were diluted beneath the minimum standards
prescribed by the license and passed off other products as licensed products.
The provision in the franchise or license agreement covering the amount
of control to be exercised by the trademark owner is the most essential
element in the agreement. Generally, these provisions provide that the
licensees shall meet certain specifications and standards of quality estab-
lished by the licensor. The licensor also should have the right to inspect and
sample the products to insure that the goods do come up to the standards
of quality established. Each licensor has its own method for checking com-
pliance. A good example of quality control and supervision by a franchisor
was discussed by the court in Turner v. HMH Publishing Co.,42 where the
court enjoined defendant's use of the name "Atlantic Playboy Club" and
held that plaintiff fully controlled its franchisees by requiring each to meet
established standards relating to decor, design, quantity and quality of
food, beverages, and entertainment in the clubs. Each club conformed to
the standards already established for existing clubs. The franchisor hired
and supervised personnel of all the clubs, and supervision was continuous.
The clubs were policed by executives of the licensor and by two indepen-
dent services which regularly and periodically visited the clubs and re-
ported on the maintenance of standards for food, beverages, services, and
decor. An operating manual was used in the clubs so each was run in ex-
actly the same manner, and all charges to members were handled from a
central office.
Merely to include a provision providing for inspection and control over
" Id. at 945, 132 U.S.P.Q. at 401.
40 159 U.S.P.Q. 221 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
41159 U.S.P.Q. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
42380 F.2d 224, 154 U.S.P.Q. 330 (5th Cir. 1967).
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the goods and services is not sufficient. The control must be exercised." In
Alligator Co. v. Robert Bruce, Inc." the court cautioned that the "mere
fact that one company has the legal right to control the quality of the
goods sold under the trademark is not finally and conclusively determina-
tive of the question whether the companies are 'related.'.... What the par-
ties actually do in carrying out the agreement is necessarily a question of
fact . . ."
In the Dawn Donut case Judge Lumbard, in dissenting," questioned the
validity of the license, and pointed out that the license failed to provide for
any system of protection and control. While he agreed that the plaintiff
may, in fact, have exercised control in spite of the absence of any expressed
grant, he did not believe that the record established that plaintiff subjected
its licensees to periodic and thorough inspection by trained personnel, but
rather showed that plaintiff's policing consisted only of chance, cursory
examinations of licensees' operations by technically untrained salesmen. He
concluded that the latter system of inspection hardly constituted a suffi-
cient program of supervision to satisfy the requirement of the Act.
The type of control required may, of course, vary depending on the
circumstances. For example, in Taffy Original Designs, Inc. v. Taffy's,
Inc." the plaintiff was a continuation of a business started by two sisters.
One sister operated, manufactured, and designed clothes-the other oper-
ated the retail store. An oral license was entered into whereby the retail
store was licensed to use the manufacturer's mark "Taffy's of California."
The defendant, who did business in Chicago, moved for a summary judg-
ment to cancel the trademark registration, claiming that the license agree-
ment did not provide for the requisite supervision and control over the
business activities and merchandise of the retail store. However, the record
showed that one of the sisters, the president of the licensor, periodically
visited the retail operation and was satisfied with the quality of the mer-
chandise. The court denied cancellation on the grounds that the public was
adequately protected against misuse of the mark and that under such
circumstances informal control satisfied the requirements of the statute.
It should be kept in mind, however, that control by franchisors which
restrains trade cannot be justified as a reasonable step taken to implement
a trademark licensing system." In Susser v. Carvel Corp." both the district
court and court of appeals agreed that the provision restraining dealers
" While it is recommended that the license agreement contain a provision spelling out the
control to be exercised, in Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros., 252 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958), the court said that when control is factually exercised it is sufficient,
and a formalized agreement is not required.
4176 F. Supp. 377, 122 U.S.P.Q. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
1 Id. at 379, 122 U.S.P.Q. at 277.
4267 F.2d at 368-69, 121 U.S.P.Q. at 437-38. Judge Lumbard wrote the majority opinion al-
though he dissented from the court's result. Part of his opinion explained the reason for his dissent.
4" 161 U.S.P.Q. 707 (N.D. IIl. 1966).
48 United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 81 U.S.P.Q. 28 (N.D. Ohio
1949), modified and aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
49206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 332 F.2d 505, 141 U.S.P.Q. 609 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 379 U.S. 885 (1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965). The Federal Trade Commission
subsequently held that the Carvel franchise agreements did not violate section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). CCH TRAoE REG. REP. 5 17,298, at 22,422 (FTC 1965).
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from selling non-Carvel products was clearly not a violation of the anti-
trust laws. The court of appeals stated: "The antitrust laws certainly do not
require that the licensor of a trademark permit his licensees to associate
with that trademark other products unrelated to those customarily sold
under the mark. It is in the public interest that products sold under one
particular trademark should be subject to the control of the trademark
owner."5 The other Carvel provision, which required purchase from
Carvel or Carvel-approved sources of not only the mix but other supplies
which were a part of the end product, gave the court more difficulty, al-
though the majority approved such arrangements. While Judge Lumbard
agreed that "in compelling circumstances the protection of goodwill, as
embodied for example in a valuable trademark, may justify an otherwise
invalid tying arrangement,"51 such as where the specifications for a substi-
tute would be so detailed that they could not practicably be supplied, he
did not believe there was sufficient evidence for the lower court's conclusion
that such arrangements were necessary to establish quality control to pro-
tect the Carvel trademark. To illustrate his argument, Judge Lumbard
compared the franchises under consideration in the Carvel case and those
considered in Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co.,2 where the agreements were
similar to the Carvel franchises. The distinguishing factor was that Dairy
Queen merely set the standards for the products sold and the franchisees
were free to purchase the products from any source so long as they main-
tained the standards set by defendant. The franchisor inspected the prem-
ises to make certain that the standards were met.
Whether a similar decision would be reached today is not certain. In
April 1969, Federal Trade Commissioner James Nicholson warned that
even if it can be shown that the importance of exclusivity is related to
quality control, one of the questions still remaining is as follows:
[A]re there alternatives to exclusivity which adequately protect the fran-
chisor's legitimate interests. The mere fact that the Lanham Act seems to
contemplate some measure of quality control by a trademark licensor does
not determine, for antitrust purposes, the permissive boundaries of such
control....
As a general rule the franchisor must not attempt to impose, in the name of
quality control, any restriction on buying which exceeds what is necessary
to achieve an otherwise legitimate result. Moreover, there is some question
as to whether even a justifiable minimum control may be set up as a per-
petual restraint on the independent business judgment of franchisees. A re-
straint which may be necessary at the outset of a franchise operation be-
cause of the unreliability of either inexperienced franchisees or untried
suppliers, should be re-examined once the reason for the restraint has been
removed.0"
50332 F.2d at 517, 141 U.S.P.Q. at 616.
5 1 id. at 512, 141 U.S.P.Q. at 613.
52203 F. Supp. 714, 133 U.S.P.Q. 505 (D. Kan. 1962).
"3 Speech before the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, Ann Arbor, Michigan, CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 5 50,238, at 55,478, 55,480-81 (1969). The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee
on Franchising stated that the Commission's decision in Carvel should be narrowly interpreted. The
Report further stated: "The case appears to be a precedent only for food industry franchising of
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He suggested that any attempted control by franchisors over purchasing
should be tested against certain standards, including:
(1) Where the purpose of exclusivity is simply to use captive dealers to
exact non-competitive prices, or for any other purpose not reasonably con-
nected with quality, the control is probably invalid.
(3) In the name of quality control a franchisor may not exceed that which
is minimally necessary."
In many instances, the franchisors have attempted to restrict the terri-
tory in which their franchisees can sell, or to control the customers to
whom they can sell. Such restraints have been recently considered by the
Supreme Court in four cases.5" However, in commenting on these decisions,
the Ad Hoc Committee on Franchising concluded that:
In laying down these principles, the Court was not directing its attention to
arrangements involving the franchising of an entire business or service
which is promoted nationally under a trademarked name and associated in
the public mind with a highly distinctive external appearance or with a
standardized uniform operation. There is no indication that the Court in-
tended these decisions to apply across the board to trademark-licensing ar-
rangements, also frequently subsumed under the term franchising, in which
the licensor imposes restrictions on the licensees to ensure the identity of
origin, quality and uniformity of the trademarked product and thus preserve
his rights in the trademark. Nothing in any of the Court's four opinions
would suggest that even in the case of outright sales of trademarked
products the Court intended to modify established trademark law which
requires the trademark owner to maintain sufficient control over his licensees
to assure that his mark will not be deemed abandoned and that the licensee
will apply the mark either to the same products or to products of sub-
stantially the same quality that the public in the past has associated with the
mark....
It would seem clear that the issues with respect to the validity of various
restrictive licensing provisions will continue to turn on whether the re-
straints are reasonably ancillary to the licensing of the mark and to the
licensor's recognized obligation to ensure the identity or origin, uniformity,
quality and to some extent the public image of his licensed product or ser-
vice.5"
III. CONCLUSION
Despite all of the criticism leveled at franchising, it seems to be here to
stay and will probably increase. The franchisor's trademark is a valuable
asset which should be protected and used with great care. Judge Dawson
an entire business where the licensed trademark is identified with such intangibles as the consumer's
expectation of a food product having uniform taste and quality." Report of Ad Hoc Comm. on
Franchising, 444 CCH TRADE REG. REPoRTs 3 (Dec. 15, 1969).
'Speech before the Institute of Continuing Legal Education, supra note 55, at 55,482.
'eUnited States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); United States v. Scaly, Inc.,
388 U.S. 350 (1967); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
56444 CCH TRADE REG. REPORTS 31-32 (Dec. 15, 1969).
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made the following appropriate observation in Susser v. Carvel Carp.,'
when he said: "[T]he cornerstone of a franchise system must be the trade-
mark or trade name of a product. It is this uniformity of product and
control of its quality and distribution which causes the public to turn to
franchise stores for the product."5
5'206 F. Supp. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 332 F.2d 505, 141 U.S.P.Q. 609 (2d Cir.), ceri.
granted, 379 U.S. 885 (1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
58 206 F. Supp. at 640. There has been a recent important decision affecting franchising opera-
tions by the district court, northern district of California, entitled Siegal v. Chicken Delight, 165
U.S.P.Q. 400 (N.D. Cal. 1970). It was held that a tie-in agreement was a violation of section 1
of the Sherman Act and cannot be justified as a convenient accounting device for compensation for
license, as an assurance of initial equipment and continuing source of supply of essential items,
or as quality control for protection of trademark goodwill.
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